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Abstract
Decentralized transferable permit systems in the transport sector can be of interest with regard
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, in spite of anticipated transaction costs. This paper
describes a concrete application of a domestic market for motor vehicle fuel consumption
permits. The marginal costs of consumption reduction vary sufficiently according to
motorists’ residential locations to consider permit exchanges. Economic evaluation of this
system reveals that there are transfers of surplus between the various groups of motorists
according to their residential locations. The central government may lose significant revenues
when compared with a conventional fuel tax. Lastly, the issue of transaction costs, the
benefits and disadvantages in terms of social acceptability and equity are discussed.
1.  Introduction
At the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the 1997 Kyoto Conference, the majority of developed
countries accepted the creation of legally binding quotas for greenhouse gas emissions
(GHGs) with the aim of stabilizing the atmospheric concentration of these gases. The
transport sector is one of the main sources of GHGs, and the principal source if we only
consider CO2 (the transport sector was responsible for 34% of French CO2 emissions in 1999,
and 30% of the CO2 emissions in the USA in 1997). In addition, the transport sector has one
of the highest potentials for further GHG emission increases. According to an OECD study,
the share of GHG emissions from transport could increase from 25% in 1995 to 30% in 2020
(OECD, 2000a).
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Studies of transport emission reduction strategies (CEMT, 1997; OECD, 2000b) have all
agreed that the foreseeable improvement in car technology is inadequate, within the 20 year
time horizon, for countries to meet the Kyoto or Rio objectives. These studies also emphasize
the need for approaches that combine technological, economic and social aspects. These
“packages” of measures should include a variety of policies for limiting vehicle-kilometres
travelled by providing alternatives to the private car, by combating urban sprawl, by
increasing public awareness, but also by means of economic instruments such as taxation or
transferable permits.
As we shall go on to explain, fuel taxation has limits with regard to efficiency and social
acceptability. For this reason, it is worthwhile considering transferable permits as an
alternative means for countries to attain their GHG emission level objectives.
However, it is generally considered that the large number of moving emission sources which
characterize transport constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to the introduction of emission
permit markets within the sector. Thus, the only economically efficient response would
involve taxation. The aim of this paper is to explain briefly what advantages a decentralized
transferable permit system in the transport sector has over traditional taxation and to propose
a concrete application of a system of this type.
The first section will discuss the limits of taxation and outline the potential advantages of
permit markets in the transport sector. The second section describes a decentralized permit
system for motorists and the socioeconomic evaluation of such a system.
2.  The limits of taxation and the potential of permits
The instrument of taxation is widely used in the transport sector, essentially because of its tax
yield. Excise duties levied in the European Union in 2002 varied in member states from
€0.296 to €0.742 per litre for premium grade petrol and from €0.242 to €0.742 per litre for
diesel oil (Commission of the European Communities, 2002). In France, fuel excise duties
provided the central government with bn€27 in 2002 for a GDP of bn€1,522. Although the
current level of taxation might be considered high, it is not high enough to reduce road fuel
consumption. The level of taxation required to reduce GHG emissions can be estimated from
the price elasticity of fuel demand, whose value varies depending on whether short-term or
long-term effects are taken into account. This is because, in the event of an increase in fuel
price, some adaptations such as changes in driving style reducing or optimizing some trips, or
changing transport mode can be implemented in the short-term (for example, in the weeks or
the months which follow the price increase). Other adaptations, such as changing one’s
vehicle, residential location or place of work, take longer. Price elasticity values vary between
–0.3 for the short-term and –0.7 for the long-term (Goodwin, 1988). This is ordinary
elasticity, related to a marshallian (or non-compensated) demand function, which therefore
includes the substitution and income effects.
We can obtain some orders of magnitude by applying a few figures to the case of France.
With a price elasticity of –0.7, a fuel cost of €1.06 /l (as in February 2000) and the objective
of reducing consumption by 10%, the price would need to rise by 14%; i.e. an additional
€0.15/l of tax. As a result of a large increase in the price of crude, the price paid by the
consumer for premium grade petrol increased by 17% (from €0.9 to €1.06) between February
1999 and February 2000. In view of the short-term elasticity, fuel consumption and traffic
should have been affected immediately. However, the two parameters continued to rise in
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here the effect of the sustained economic growth observed at the end of the 1990s. The
amount of tax required to reduce GHG emissions should also therefore take account of the
income elasticity of fuel demand, which is positive. In other terms, in order to remain
effective, the tax on fuels should increase at the same rate as the economy grows.
Furthermore, variations in the price of petrol are likely to cancel out the effect of this tax on
the end consumer. The turnaround in the oil market that took place in 2001 essentially
cancelled out the 1999-2000 price rise, as the price of premium grade unleaded petrol returned
to a little under €1 (the usual level in 2002 and 2003): the price effects of a GHG tax would
have been wiped out.
Lastly, the “tax rebellion” that took place in several European countries in September 2000
shows how sensitive public opinion is to fuel taxation (Lyons and Chatterjee, 2002). Central
government is a focus for opposition as it benefits from the tax, although it has little control
over oil prices. 
Thus, not only do fluctuations in oil prices mean that the effectiveness of a tax is extremely
unpredictable, it is also not at all sure that it would be accepted by public opinion. Both these
factors encourage us to explore the feasibility of GHG emission permits in the transport
sector. 
According to Godard’s general definition (in OECD, 2001), transferable permits are a variety
of instruments ranging from the introduction of flexibility into conventional regulation to the
organization of competitive permit markets. These instruments share the following common
features: (1) they involve the fixing of quantified constraints (quotas); (2) these quotas (or
rights) are initially allocated to agents independently of the environmental obligations
imposed on them; (3) agents are authorized to transfer these quotas between different
activities or different places (averaging), between different periods of time (banking) or to
other agents (trading); (4) ad hoc penalties are applied to ensure that agents only emit the
equivalent of those rights or quotas which they hold.
Our theoretical and practical knowledge and the potential for transferable permits in the
transport sector have been analyzed by Raux (2004). For transport, transferable permits have
some interesting features when compared with taxation.
•  The price response function of agents is affected by a non-negligible degree of
uncertainty. Furthermore, the price elasticity of fuel demand is low in the short or
medium term: a quantitative objective would be easier to achieve with the permit
system than with taxation.
•  In view of the high level of fuel taxation in Europe, freely allocated permits would be
seen by agents as a means of escaping an additional tax, possibly making the new
instrument more acceptable.
•  Quota systems are the only systems which allow distributive aspects to be treated in an
explicit manner, independently from the issue of the economically efficient allocation
of efforts to reduce environmental damage: in view of the fundamental role of
transport as regards access to activities, particular attention must be given to these
distributive impacts.
•  When transferable permits are applied to GHG emissions from transport it is possible
to fix precise quantitative objectives for each agent, as overall output is equal to the
sum of agents’ individual outputs; at planetary level it matters little where GHGs are
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The most frequent stated argument against the use of permit systems in the transport sector is
the administrative costs of such systems which, by definition, target a large number of mobile
sources. Perhaps this explains why the only application or propositions in the literature are
confined to systems that concern unitary vehicle emissions (for example, Albrecht, 2000;
Wang, 1994 and the ZEV programme in Raux, 2004), or household car ownership (Walton,
1997). Nevertheless, these systems have the disadvantage of ignoring another component of
total emissions, fuel consumption through actual vehicle use.
This is why the following section of the paper proposes a system of transferable permits
which is applied to the fuel consumption of motorists. The main challenge here is to reduce
the administrative costs of such a system as much as possible.
3.  A system of transferable permits applied to motorists
We begin by describing, in practical terms, the form that a permit system applied to motorists
could take. In the case of France, private cars account for approximately three-fifth of fuel
sales, the rest being consumed by light commercial vehicles and heavy goods vehicles. We
shall then evaluate this system both quantitatively and qualitatively before briefly discussing
an extension of it to the commercial sector.
3.1.  A transferable permit market 
Obligations and permit holders  
An economic incentive instrument achieves its maximum efficiency when it operates at the
most decentralized level possible. In the case we are considering, this is the level of motorists
as consumers of fuel and hence emitters of CO2 so it is this group who should hold the
permits and have the obligations.
A consumer who purchases motor vehicle fuel (which will necessarily be burnt) will have to
transfer the corresponding quotas to the regulating authority. These quotas will then be
cancelled. The quota corresponds to an authorization to emit the CO2 equivalent of a litre of
fuel1. These quotas may be held initially by the agent or purchased from another agent who
participates in the permit market.
The allocation and validity of quotas
Free allocation of permits minimizes problems of social and political acceptability as it allows
a certain amount of fuel to be consumed without incurring any additional cost. This means
that a minimum level of travel can be guaranteed to all users who possess no viable
alternative to the car. 
                                                
1 Strictly speaking, this value should vary according to the type of fuel, as a function of the average amount of
CO2 emitted by combustion (diesel fuel contains more carbon than petrol). For the purpose of simplicity in this
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To do this, our starting point can be an average consumption of 1,000 litres per car per year2.
If we impose a 10% reduction in this consumption, 900 permits should be allocated (to buy
900 litres at the normal price) per car per year.
The Kyoto protocol in fact only represents a first stage towards achieving more drastic
emission reduction objectives. Short-term travel behaviours are to a large degree determined
by more long-term location choices – particularly residential ones. The regulating authority
should therefore introduce a regular reduction in the number of permits that are allocated with
a rolling horizon of about a decade. 
The permits remain valid for an unlimited period, which may lead to hoarding and
speculation. However, the number of quotas held by an agent will be reduced in the following
year in accordance with the rate of the reduction in free permit allocations decided by the
regulating authority.
Exchange mechanism
In order to consume more than 900 litres of fuel, a consumer must purchase additional permits
on the market. On the other hand, a consumer who does not use all his/her allocated permits
could sell them. The possibility of selling permits provides an additional incentive for
modifying one’s behaviour, particularly for persons who can do so at low cost.
Monitoring, verification and penalties
The sale and purchase of permits will be supervised at national level by a regulatory authority.
The permits which are awarded annually will be held on a chipcard which records permit
debit and credit operations. This card will be compatible with the automatic teller machines
(ATM) that are already installed at petrol stations. Permits can therefore be debited or
purchased at the current rate when buying fuel. It will also be possible to purchase or resell
permits in banks, using automatic bank distributors or over the Internet.
3.2.  A combined taxation and permit system
It would be socially unacceptable to make a sudden transition from a system of taxation to a
system of permits. The two systems will therefore have to coexist, and it will be necessary to
provide a financial incentive to adopt the permit system. 
Also, in order to reduce administrative costs, permit utilization operations will have to be
validated as close as possible to the time of fuel purchase, that is to say when the motorist
buys fuel at the pump. It will therefore not be possible to create an impenetrable
administrative barrier between the system of taxation and the system of permits.
A possible solution would be to set up a tax t, which would be paid both by fuel consumers
who are outside the permit market and those who are taking part in it but who have used up
their initial allocation and who are either unable or unwilling to purchase permits on the
market. The last group could fulfil their obligations by paying the tax t.  This tax would
therefore constitute a price ceiling of permits on the market (Baumol and Oates, 1988).
                                                
2 Our quantitative simulations were performed for 1997 which was the most recent year for which data on the
car fleet and fuel consumption was available (the SOFRES-ADEME Parc Auto panel, cf. INRETS, 1999). Based
on the mileages and unitary consumption figures which are reported by the panel (13,719 km on average, and
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This tax would have to be calculated with reference to the country’s international
commitments. If we take the case of France, for example, in view of the fact that the country
is committed to stabilizing its emissions to the 1990 level and the increase that has occurred
since then, we can make the (optimistic) hypothesis that only a 10% reduction in emissions
will be required in 2008 compared to 1997. 
The average price of all fuels at the pump in France in 1997 was €0.85. In order to create a
strong incentive to transfer from the tax regime to the permit regime and in view of the
uncertainty that affects the price elasticity, the tax t or permit ceiling price must be based on
the most pessimistic elasticity hypothesis, i.e.-0.3: this would correspond to a 33% increase in
the price of fuel (inclusive of tax) i.e. €0.28 in 1997.
Taking part in the permit system could also be voluntary. Motorists would be encouraged to
join the permit system as by doing so they would receive a free allocation of permits. The free
allocation is linked to an act of economic consumption (possession and use of a car), which
moderates the windfall effect caused by the fact that permits are free. The incentive of
increasing the number of cars one owns is limited by vehicle insurance and maintenance
costs, which are inescapable because periodic vehicle inspection. This windfall effect could
only come into play if the cost of permits on the markets became very high: however, the
price of permits is bounded by the tax t.
3.3.  Operation of the market, opening and closure
Should the permit market for the transport sector be closed or open to a national or
international cross-sector permit market? 
Fluctuations in the market price of permits will indicate their scarcity and the need for any
adjustments. If too few permits are allocated, the price of the permits will tend to rise:
however, this price is bounded by the tax t.
A permit market of this type could at the beginning operate on a mainly domestic basis: it
would be viable in view of the generally short distances involved in car trips and if we ignore
the impact of “tank tourism” at borders. The risk of this should be quite small as France’s
neighbouring countries will also have to meet the costs associated with the consumption of
fossil fuel as they are also committed to reduce their emissions. 
If the permit market for the transport sector is closed, the price of a permit on this market
could be compared with the price of a permit on another national or international market, on
the basis of carbon content. It would thus be possible to assess whether the transport sector
was being subjected to lower, similar or higher pressure than the others. If the pressure is
insufficient, it would mean that the other sectors would have to compensate for it or that
central government would have to finance the difference by buying permits on the
international market. By closing the market, central government can thus decide to
concentrate its efforts on one sector rather than another, for a variety of social or political
reasons.
In general, if markets are closed each other, the marginal costs of reducing CO2 emissions are
likely not to be the same in different sectors. Distortions of this type will reduce the efficiency
of the system. Closure of the market can therefore only be considered as a temporary measure.
Ultimately, the transferable market system should be open, that is to say that everyone in the
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3.4.  Evaluation of the proposed system
In what follows, we shall present two forms of evaluation. The first is quantitative and
involves an estimation of the surpluses that result from the operation of a market of this type.
The other is qualitative and involves identifying the administrative costs and a discussion of
additional issues associated with a system of this type. With regard to equity, surplus
calculations have the advantage of showing how gains and losses are distributed on the one
hand between central government and consumers in general and on the other hand between
the different categories of consumers.
Evaluation of the surpluses of the different actors involved
We shall start by describing the method and hypotheses we have applied to calculate
surpluses. We shall then present the results of our calculations.
Hypotheses and calculation method
Figure 1 shows a convenient approximation of the demand curve, that is to say change in
demanded quantities (motor vehicle fuel, on the x-axis of this graph) as a function of the price
(on the y-axis). The current exclusive of tax price (P0) corresponds to that part of the price
that is paid to the distributor. To this is added current taxation (VAT and excise duty) which is
considered as a lump sum paid into the treasury, i.e. the price P1. Adding a GHG tax with the
level of t (the price of the permit) will increase the price to P2. The price of the permit is
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The transition from a price of P0 to a price of P1 will result in a modification of behaviours,
which will in turn reduce fuel demand, from Q0 to Q1. The resulting surpluses will be as
follows3:
•  S1 represents the loss in consumer surplus resulting, for example, from the reduction of
trip-making or the purchase of a more fuel-efficient but more expensive car: this loss is
net of the cost of the fuel that is no longer consumed (Q0-Q1).P1.
•  S2 represents, in the case of taxation, the gain in central government’s surplus that results
from the newly paid tax on the fuel4 that is consumed Q1. In the case of permits, central
government is no longer involved and S2 represents, for consumers, the gains that result
from the sale of permits or the losses that result from the purchase of permits. 
•  S3 represents the loss in the surplus of central government as a result of taxes which are no
longer paid on the fuel which is no longer consumed (Q0-Q1). 
•  S4 represents the loss in the surplus of other agents (distributors, refiners, oil producers,
etc.) because the amount of fuel (Q0-Q1) is no longer consumed: this quantity S4 is only
mentioned here for information.
The surplus for fuel consumers is (S1–S2). The surplus for central government is (S2+S3) when
the tax is applied and S3 in the case of permits. The overall surplus for society is (S1+S3+S4).
In these calculations, it has been assumed that variation in demand does not affect the price of
fuel before tax P0.
In addition, as we are only comparing the tax with the permits, we take no account of gains in
congestion, accidents, local pollution and noise which would result from a reduction in traffic,
as these gains are similar in both cases.
In order to calculate surpluses, it is necessary to hypothesize values for the elasticity of
demand, which as stated above vary between –0.3 (short-term elasticity) –0.7 (long-term
elasticity). Consumers must modify their behaviours in order to reduce fuel consumption, in
particular by reducing vehicle-kilometres travelled: the difficulty of this adaptation will
depend on the closeness of jobs, shops and services, and supply of alternative transport modes
to the car. An essential dimension therefore is the type of residential area.
Statistics concerning traffic levels and fuel consumption according to type of residential
location are provided by the INRETS analysis mentioned above (Hivert, 1999): this study
distinguishes four types of location: the city centre, the suburbs, the periurban zone and rural
areas5.
As we do not have detailed knowledge about the elasticities for the different categories of
motorists, we have had to hypothesize elasticity values for the four groups of motorists
identified on the basis of type of residential location: it is reasonable to assume that elasticity
is highest for persons living in the city centre (who are the nearest to activities and who have
the best public transport supply) and that this elasticity decreases as one moves towards rural
zones. These values are adjusted so as to obtain the average overall elasticity level, on the
basis of the percentage of vehicles originating in each category of residential location.
Using the four elasticity values we then calculate the average surpluses for each vehicle S1,
S2, S3, S4, the total surplus for motorists, central government and the other actors, then the
                                                
3 In what follows, the surpluses are considered to be positive for the agents who benefit from a gain and negative
for the agents who suffer a loss.
4 S2 is a loss for consumers.
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average values of these surpluses per vehicle. This calculation has been conducted for two
average overall elasticity values, –0.3 and –0.7, and for the situation with taxation and the
situation with permits. The detailed results of these calculations are given in the appendix.
Results
An initial comparison between the tax and the permits can be made on a global basis without
distinguishing between different types of residential location.
For each average elasticity value, the total surpluses and “other surpluses” (S4) are identical
by construction in the case of the tax and the permits. The essential difference between these
two systems results from the transfers between motorists and central government.
In the case of the tax and with an elasticity of –0.3, which is the least favourable adaptation
hypothesis, motorists as a group lose almost bn€7.2 and central government gains almost
bn€5.1. With an elasticity of –0.7, these values are respectively bn€3 and bn€1.2. As a matter
of interest, the total tax collected on fuels amounted to approximately bn€30.5 in 1998, of
which bn€23.6 came from excise duty. For these two elasticity values, the average additional
annual tax levy per vehicle would be respectively €275 and €118.
In the case of permits, these transfers are very much reduced because of the initial free permit
allocation. For each of the two elasticity values (–0.3 and –0.7) motorists as a group would
lose respectively €374M and €161M, the annual loss per vehicle would be respectively €14
and €6.
The dramatic change is experienced by central government as, with the permits, it loses more
than bn€1.7 of tax revenue. This is the result of the loss S3, due to the reduction in the
amounts of fuel consumed, which are not compensated for by an additional tax which does
not exist as there is redistribution between motorists as a result of permit exchanges.
Next, we can make a second comparison by observing what happens for different categories
of households on the basis of residential location. On average, with the tax, the per vehicle tax
levies differ by a maximum of fifty euros per year in the least favourable case (elasticity of –
0.3) and by about fifteen euros in the other case.
The situation is of course different in the case of the permits. The volume of permit exchanges
will vary according to our hypothesis concerning the elasticities for the different categories of
households and the average overall elasticity.
In the least favourable adaptation situation (elasticity of –0.3), approximately 1.4 billion
permits would be exchanged (to be compared with fuel consumption of 26 billion litres).
Households who live in city centres or the suburbs would, on average, be vendors. The
monetary gain would compensate for the loss due to their lower consumption, on average
there would be a net, but low, per vehicle gain (an average of €9 and €3 respectively over one
year). Inhabitants of the periurban zone would on average be the largest purchasers and would
make an average loss of €41 per vehicle over one year.
In the case of an elasticity of –0.7, about 1 billion permits would be exchanged. In this case
too, households located in the city centre or the suburbs would be vendors. This monetary
gain would just compensate for the loss that would result from the reduction in their
consumption. In this case too, the biggest purchasers would be those living in the periurban
areas and this group would suffer an average net loss of €16 per vehicle over the year, more
than three times that of rural households (€5).
These quantitative results should, of course, only be seen as providing an order of magnitude
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different elasticities according to the type of residential location. However, on the basis of
these results, we can identify three factors that merit further discussion.
First, the comparison between taxation and permits in this case involves the tax levy in the
case of the tax and the tax loss for the central government in the case of permits. Nevertheless,
this loss would only represent approximately 5% of current fiscal revenue from fuel
consumption.
Second, the tax has very little effect on the distribution of surpluses between households
according to their type of residential location, as the tax levy is already very high in all cases:
all motorists “lose” to the benefit of society. Third, in the case of permits, the above tax levy
disappears and residential location plays a fundamental role: the main winners are households
living in the city centre or the suburbs who, on average, sell permits (they can more easily
save fuel, therefore permits, by reducing their vehicle-kilometres travelled) while the
households living in periurban areas are on average the largest purchasers. The orders of
magnitude are of a few euros or tens of Euros of net gains or losses on average every year for
each vehicle and between each category of location.
Although these sums might seem small at first sight, it should be remembered that they are
average results per category of motorists and may cover extremely varied adjustment
behaviours.
Other characteristics
The costs of setting up and administering the system would include:
•  Altering the software in the ATM at petrol stations so they can deal with the permit
system (reading the balance, debiting); 
•  Manufacturing and distributing chipcards, or installing the microcode software on existing
chip cards during periodic replacement; 
•  The information campaign for this new system of transactions, additional to the
information campaign which would be necessary in any case before introducing any
emission control measure; 
•  Managing the permit exchange market which could be included on the stock exchange.
In view of the fact that the transactions and verifications required for the permits will be
highly integrated with the current system of credit card transactions, these costs should be
moderate. Furthermore, they could be covered by a fee charged on each permit exchanged,
which would be extremely low in view of the high volumes involved. 
This system has the advantage of simplicity, as the unit of exchange is the permit for each
litre of fuel that is consumed. The amounts consumed or exchanged are therefore monitored
when fuel is purchased, and all persons who purchase fuel can participate in the market (see
below for the case of commercial vehicles): monitoring is therefore straightforward as it only
involves fuel purchases. The fact that the tax t sets an upper bound for the price of permits and
the possibility of freely exchanging permits will discourage any tendency for a black market
to develop. 
The free allocation of emission rights creates income which is distributed between the
consumers of fuel. In addition, these consumers are strongly encouraged to reduce their
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Problems of equity can arise if all vehicles are allocated the same number of permits as a
result of specific constraints of use: families with children, disabled persons, persons living in
rural areas, etc. There is no reason why the free allocation of permits should not be based on
socioeconomic characteristics. It would also be possible for permits to be allocated to all
individuals, irrespective of their age and whether they own the car.
This system penalizes high income households more than others: the data from 1997 show
that the average per kilometre mileage for each vehicle increases fairly steadily with income
bracket, from slightly more than 12,000 km for the lowest income brackets (less than 11.4
thousand euros per year) to almost 16,000 km for the highest income brackets (more than 61
thousand euros per year).
Lastly, the initial free allocation avoids imposing an excessive burden on consumers,
particularly the least well off. The average annual consumption of cars varies from slightly
more than 900 litres (for the lowest incomes) to 1300 or 1400 litres (for the highest incomes),
while the proportion of mileage that is covered on home-to-work trips varies between 24%
(for the lowest incomes) and 30 or even 39% for the highest income groups. These figures
show that “necessary” travel would generally not be affected. However, this average data
should not obscure a possible existence of situations of fragility, for example the “rural poor”
who have no alternative but the car; such situations would require ad hoc compensation.
A similar system could also be introduced for freight and public transport vehicles. However,
international competition between carriers plays an important role and regulates the transport
market: this means that a permit system for commercial vehicles would have to operate at
least at European Union level. Furthermore, the political difficulties involved in introducing
taxes or permits in the road freight transport sector as a result of the economic fragility of
many companies, should not be forgotten.
4.  Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how decentralized transferable permit systems for the transport
sector are of interest with regard to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, in spite of anticipated
transaction costs. Next, a system of transferable permits for motorists has been described, and
its technical and economic feasibility investigated: the marginal costs of depollution vary
sufficiently according to motorists’ residential locations for us to envisage permit exchanges.
Last, we have outlined an evaluation of the socioeconomic consequences of the operation of
this kind of market and the surpluses that would result from it, with plausible elasticities
derived from empirical studies.
These simulations have shown that with a system of permits that can be transferred between
motorists, central government would only lose 5% of its fiscal revenue from fuel taxes. The
loss in surplus for motorists would be of the order of €10 per vehicle on average in the case of
permits as opposed to between €100 to €275 on average in the case of a GHG emission tax:
this is obviously a factor that assists the acceptability of a permit system. The number of
exchanges would be large, of the order of one billion permits per year (with a cost of between
€0.12 and €0.28 per permit). Residents of city centres and suburbs would, on average, tend to
sell permits while those in periurban areas or in rural areas would tend to purchase them. 
One of the main objections to the application of a system of transferable permits to the
transport sector is the large number of actors involved. The resulting transaction costs would
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overcomes many of these constraints. Its implementation would nevertheless be complex and
administratively more costly than a simple increase in fuel taxation.
Nevertheless, this system does provide strong incentives for reducing consumption because of
the concrete, tangible, benefits perceived by those who reduce their emissions below their
initial allocation. The free allocation of permits furthermore provides a means of overcoming
problems of accessibility and equity which would be posed by the addition of a new tax on an
already heavily taxed product such as fuel.
Another advantage of this system is that a permit based on the carbon content of fuel can be
directly linked with the world market for transferable permits in order to avoid inefficient
price distortions between these markets. Nevertheless, central government could maintain
complete control over the domestic market and would thus be able to protect it from
fluctuations on the world market.
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 litres / 











city centre -0.55 12 918 980 7.58 -179 7.2 27
suburbs -0.40 12 869 977 7.59 -130 7.3 28
periurban -0.10 14 809 1 085 7.33 -36 10.7 41
rural -0.05 14 035 988 7.04 -16 1.0 4
average -0.3 13 719 1 022 7.46 -101 26.2 100
(1) per vehicle per year. Based on survey findings
Average price in 1997 (€) 0.85 (2) in litres / vehicle per year. Based on survey findings
of which existing taxes 0.65 (3) ratio between (1) and (2)
Tax or permit price 0.28 (4) in litres / vehicle. Application of price elasticity
Initial price + tax 1.13 (5) based on survey findings
Permit allocation (litres) 921
change in surplus with fuel tax
average per vehicle
Location
S1       
(€)
S2        
(€)
S3       
(€)





gov.     
(M€)
others    
(M€)
total     
(M€)
user     
(€)
central 
gov.     
(€)
others    
(€)
total     
(€)
city centre -25 226 -117 -36 -1 806 788 -257 -1 275 -252 110 -36 -178
suburbs -18 240 -85 -26 -1 892 1 137 -191 -946 -258 155 -26 -129
periurban -5 297 -23 -7 -3 229 2 923 -77 -383 -302 273 -7 -36
rural -2 275 -11 -3 -272 259 -3 -16 -277 264 -3 -16
overall: -7 198 5 107 -528 -2 620 -275 195 -20 -100
change in surplus with permit
average per vehicle
Location
S1       
(€)
S2        
(€)
S3       
(€)








gov.     
(M€)
others    
(M€)
total     
(M€)
user     
(€)
central 
gov.     
(€)
others    
(€)
total     
(€)
city centre -25 34 -117 -36 870 64 -836 -257 -1 029 9 -117 -36 -144
suburbs -18 21 -85 -26 546 20 -620 -191 -791 3 -85 -26 -108
periurban -5 -36 -23 -7 -1 367 -441 -251 -77 -770 -41 -23 -7 -72
rural -2 -14 -11 -3 -49 -16 -10 -3 -30 -16 -11 -3 -30
overall: 0 -374 -1 718 -528 -2 620 -14 -66 -20 -100
entire fleet average per vehicle
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city centre -1.00 12 918 980 7.58 -139 7.2 27
suburbs -0.85 12 869 977 7.59 -118 7.3 28
periurban -0.45 14 809 1 085 7.33 -70 10.7 41
rural -0.40 14 035 988 7.04 -56 1.0 4
average -0.7 13 719 1 022 7.46 -102 26.2 100
(1) per vehicle per year. Based on survey findings
Average price in 1997 (€) 0.85 (2) in litres / vehicle per year. Based on survey findings
of which existing taxes 0.65 (3) ratio between (1) and (2)
Tax or permit price 0.12 (4) in litres / vehicle. Application of price elasticity
Initial price + tax 0.97 (5) based on survey findings
Permit allocation (litres) 921
change in surplus with fuel tax
average per vehicle
Location
S1       
(€)
S2        
(€)
S3       
(€)





gov.     
(M€)
others    
(M€)
total     
(M€)
user     
(€)
central 
gov.     
(€)
others    
(€)
total     
(€)
city centre -8 102 -91 -28 -789 79 -200 -910 -110 11 -28 -127
suburbs -7 104 -77 -24 -814 198 -173 -789 -111 27 -24 -108
periurban -4 123 -45 -14 -1 359 831 -149 -677 -127 78 -14 -63
rural -3 113 -37 -11 -114 75 -11 -50 -116 76 -11 -51
overall: -3 076 1 183 -533 -2 426 -118 45 -20 -93
change in surplus with permit
average per vehicle
Location
S1       
(€)
S2        
(€)
S3       
(€)








gov.     
(M€)
others    
(M€)
total     
(M€)
user     
(€)
central 
gov.     
(€)
others    
(€)
total     
(€)
city centre -8 10 -91 -28 577 9 -650 -200 -840 1 -91 -28 -117
suburbs -7 7 -77 -24 453 2 -563 -173 -734 0 -77 -24 -100
periurban -4 -12 -45 -14 -1 019 -168 -483 -149 -800 -16 -45 -14 -75
rural -3 -1 -37 -11 -11 -5 -36 -11 -52 -5 -37 -11 -53
overall: 0 -161 -1 732 -533 -2 426 -6 -66 -20 -93
entire fleet average per vehicle
entire fleet average per vehicle
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